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Abstract
Nominal exchange rates are remarkably volatile. They ordinarily appear disconnected from the
fundamentals of the economies whose currencies they price. These facts make up a classic puzzle
about the international economy. If prices do not respond fully to changes in the nominal exchange
rate, who bears the cost of such large and unpredictable changes: foreign ﬁrms, domestic ﬁrms, or
domestic consumers? This study develops a structural approach to analyze the welfare eﬀects of a
change in the nominal exchange rate using the example of the beer market. I estimate a structural
econometric model that makes it possible to compute manufacturers’ and retailers’ pass-through
of a nominal exchange-rate change without observing wholesale prices or ﬁrms’ marginal costs.
I conduct counterfactual experiments to quantify how the change aﬀects domestic and foreign
ﬁrms’ proﬁts and domestic consumer welfare. The counterfactual experiments show that foreign
manufacturers bear more of the cost of a change in the nominal exchange rate than do domestic
consumers, domestic manufacturers, or the domestic retailer. Following a 10-percent domestic-
currency depreciation, foreign manufacturers’ proﬁts decline by 22 percent, domestic consumer
surplus falls by 8 percent, the retailer’s proﬁts fall by 5 percent, and domestic manufacturers’
proﬁts increase by 1.7 percent. The model can be applied to other industries and can serve as a
tool to assess the welfare eﬀects of various exchange-rate policies.
Keywords: exchange-rate pass-through, cross-border vertical contracts, welfare eﬀects of
exchange-rate ﬂuctuations.
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Nominal exchange rates are remarkably volatile. They ordinarily appear
disconnected from the fundamentals of the economies whose currencies they
price. These facts make up a classic puzzle about the international econ-
omy. If prices do not respond fully to changes in the nominal exchange rate,
who bears the cost of such large and unpredictable changes: foreign ￿rms,
domestic ￿rms, or domestic consumers? This study examines the welfare ef-
fects of a change in the nominal exchange rate using the example of the beer
industry. We should care about analyzing these welfare e⁄ects, not only to
understand how the nominal exchange rate a⁄ects the domestic economy but
also because assumptions about exchange-rates￿welfare e⁄ects shape econo-
mists￿policy recommendations on basic issues in international ￿nancial mar-
kets. For example, policymakers often want to know how much a currency
must depreciate to eliminate a given trade de￿cit. How ￿rms choose to pass
through an exchange-rate depreciation determines the depreciation￿ s welfare
e⁄ects, including its e⁄ect on the trade balance. Exchange-rate pass-through
is conventionally de￿ned as the percent change in an imported good￿ s local-
currency price for a given percent change in the nominal exchange rate.
More empirical evidence about ￿rms￿pass-through behavior would enable
economists to recommend a welfare-maximizing response to a given trade
1de￿cit. Such evidence would also shape policy recommendations on such is-
sues as the choice of exchange-rate regime, the conduct of monetary policy,
and the response to a currency crisis.
I develop and estimate a structural econometric model that o⁄ers pre-
dictions linking ￿rms￿pass-through behavior to strategic interactions with
other ￿rms (supply conditions) and to interactions with consumers (demand
conditions). Using the estimated demand system, I conduct counterfactual
experiments to quantify how a nominal exchange-rate change a⁄ects domes-
tic and foreign ￿rms￿pro￿ts and consumer surplus. The structural model
computes these e⁄ects without observing wholesale prices or marginal costs
(of manufacturers or retailers). The model can be applied to other industries
and can serve as a tool to assess the welfare e⁄ects of various exchange-rate
policies.
My general strategy is to estimate brand-level demand and then to use
those estimates jointly with assumptions about ￿rms￿pricing behavior to re-
cover both retail and manufacturer marginal costs without observing actual
costs. I then use the estimated demand system, assumptions about ￿rms￿
pricing behavior, and the derived marginal costs to compute the new equilib-
rium following an exchange-rate-induced change in foreign brands￿marginal
costs. I compute the change in ￿rms￿pro￿ts and in consumer surplus using
2the new equilibrium prices and quantities.
The model￿ s key identi￿cation assumption is that nominal exchange-
rate ￿ uctuations dwarf other shocks to manufacturers￿marginal costs such
as productivity or input-price changes over the short term. Figure 1 shows
that the exchange rate is much more volatile than are brewers￿other typical
marginal costs. Thus this assumption, though strong, has clear support in
the data. The paper presents ￿gures that indicate the model appears to
captures exchange-rate movements for each of the sample￿ s countries.
Figure 1: The nominal exchange rate ￿ uctuates by much more than do other
typical input prices for German brewers.
Though several theoretical papers examine how exchange-rate ￿ uctua-
3tions may a⁄ect welfare, no published empirical study has formally esti-
mated these costs.1 A valuable antecedent of this paper is Kadiyali￿ s (1997)
structural model of pass-through in the ￿lm industry. Kadiyali￿ s model is
applicable, however, only to industries with very few products, while the
model presented here can be applied to many industries.2
I empirically test for the best-￿t vertical market structure in the beer
market in another paper by comparing accounting price-cost margins to
the derived price-cost margins each vertical model produces and by using
non-nested tests developed by Villas-Boas (2003). This paper￿ s empirical
analysis focuses on the best-￿t vertical market structure for this industry,
that is, double marginalization with manufacturers acting as multi-product
￿rms.3
My data come from a single large retailer (with 120 stores) in a major
Midwestern city. I use a panel data set of retail prices and quantities sold
for 34 products from a number of manufacturers over 40 months (July 1991-
December 1994). My model thus includes a single retailer and a number
of manufacturers, whom I model as Bertrand-Nash competitors with di⁄er-
1Devereux, Engel, and Tille (2003) and Corsetti, Pesenti, Roubini, and Tille (2000)
present theoretical models of the welfare e⁄ects of exchange-rate ￿ uctuations.
2Another important predecessor is Goldberg￿ s (1995) structural model of the U.S. auto
market which uses a nested-logit demand system.
3For more detail on the double-marginalization supply model, see Tirole (1988).
4entiated products. The model includes an outside good and thus does not
assume that the retailer has a monopoly in the local market.
Beer is a good that is fairly concentrated at the manufacturer level,
consistent with my assumption of oligopoly. Because manufactured goods￿
prices tend to exhibit dampened responses to exchange rates in aggregate
data, beer is an appropriate choice to investigate the puzzling phenomenon
of incomplete pass-through. The threat of trade barriers such as voluntary
export restraints or antidumping sanctions that likely a⁄ect price-setting
behavior in other industries, such as autos or textiles, are rare in this indus-
try.
The counterfactual experiments produce three major results. First, for-
eign manufacturers generally bear more of the cost (or reap more of the ben-
e￿t) of a change in the nominal exchange rate than do consumers, domestic
manufacturers, or the retailer. Following a 10-percent domestic currency
depreciation, foreign manufacturers￿pro￿ts decline by 22 percent, domestic
consumer surplus by 8 percent, and the retailer￿ s pro￿ts by 5 percent: Do-
mestic manufacturers￿pro￿ts increase by 1.7 percent. Second, the results
suggest some strategic interaction between domestic and foreign manufactur-
ers following a depreciation: domestic manufacturers with brands that are
close substitutes for foreign brands increase their pro￿ts by lowering prices
5to take market share from foreign manufacturers. Third, previous work on
pass-through did not model the pricing decision of the retailer, and thus
implicitly assumed that manufacturers￿interactions with downstream ￿rms
did not matter. My ￿ndings suggest that the retailer plays an important role
by absorbing part of an exchange-rate-induced marginal-cost shock before it
reaches consumers. I ￿nd that the retailer passes through wholesale-price in-
creases on domestic brands fully, but only partially passes through identical
price increases on foreign brands. The retailer￿ s markups on foreign brands
are roughly three times its markups on domestic brands: the retailer may
regard these higher markups as compensation for their greater ￿ uctuation
over time.
Incomplete data has limited the pass-through literature. Prices along the
distribution chain, particularly import and wholesale prices, are typically
unavailable. It is also di¢ cult to obtain cost data amenable to comparison
from foreign manufacturers. As a result, there is virtually no disaggregated
empirical evidence on exchange-rate pass-through.4 Most studies use price
indexes that leave their estimates vulnerable to aggregation bias. The con-
sensus in these studies is that ￿rms pass through, on average, 50 percent of a
4Only one paper by Kadiyali (1997) estimates pass-through coe¢ cients using product-
level prices.
6nominal exchange-rate change to import prices over the course of one year.5
This paper uses product-level transaction prices, allowing for an empirical
method based on a model of individual ￿rms￿price-setting behavior rather
than aggregate price indexes.
The empirical method presented in this paper also o⁄ers an alternative to
the standard reduced-form approach used to estimate exchange-rate pass-
through. The standard approach has the weakness of producing di⁄erent
for researchers using identical data. That approach uses a speci￿cation that
imposes a ￿rm￿ s markup adjustment through the choice of functional form.6
Such a model cannot gauge the extent of the strategic pricing behavior that
￿rms engage in to protect their margins.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I review
the theoretical model. Section 3 discusses the market and the data, and
section 4 sets out the estimation methodology. Results from the random-
coe¢ cients demand model are reported in section 5, and the results of the
counterfactual experiments in section 6. The last section concludes.
5Goldberg and Knetter (1997).
6The assumption implicit in the standard approach is that the markup adjustment is
exactly inversely proportional to the pass-through.
72 Model
This section describes the supply model and the random-coe¢ cients model
used to estimate demand. It then derives simple expressions to compute
exchange-rate pass-through coe¢ cients.
2.1 Supply
Consider a double-marginalization supply model in which manufacturers act
as Bertrand oligopolists with di⁄erentiated products. Strategic interactions
between manufacturers and the single retailer with respect to prices follow
a sequential Nash model. Manufacturers set their prices ￿rst and the re-
tailer then sets its prices taking the wholesale prices it observes as given.
Thus, a double margin is added to the marginal cost to produce the product.
To solve the model, one uses backwards induction and solves the retailer￿ s
problem ￿rst. The variety of potential interactions between manufactur-
ers, retailers, and consumers makes any theoretical prediction about welfare
e⁄ects contingent on fairly precise assumptions about consumer or ￿rm be-
havior. In this model, I consider only one retailer as the data used for the
empirical analysis have prices for only a single retail ￿rm.
82.1.1 Retailer
Consider a single retail ￿rm that sells all of the market￿ s J di⁄erentiated
products. The model assumes that all ￿rms use linear pricing and face
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where pr
jt is the price the retailer sets for product j, pw
jt is the wholesale
price paid by the retailer for product j, mcr
jt is the the retailer￿ s marginal
cost for product j (excluding the wholesale price of the good), sjt(p
r) is
the market share of product j which is a function of the prices of all J
products, and Cf is a ￿xed cost of production. Assuming the retailer sets
prices to maximize pro￿ts, the retail price pr












= 0; for j;k = 1;2;:::;Jt: (2)
This gives us a set of J equations, one for each product. The markups




jt j;k = 1;:::;J:; and a J ￿ J
matrix ￿rt called the retailer reaction matrix with the jth, kth element
equal to Sjk ; the marginal change in the kth product￿ s market share given
9a change in the jth product￿ s retail price. The stacked ￿rst-order conditions
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Let there be M manufacturers that each produce some subset ￿mt of the
market￿ s Jt di⁄erentiated products. Each manufacturer chooses its wholesale
price pw
jt while assuming the retailer behaves according to its ￿rst-order










jt is the marginal cost of the manufacturer. Assuming a Bertrand-










= 0 for j = 1;2;:::;Jt: (6)




the change in each product￿ s share with respect to a change each product￿ s
wholesale price. Multiproduct ￿rms are represented by a manufacturer own-
ership matrix, Tw, with elements Tw (j;k)= 1 if both products j and k are
produced by the same manufacturer, and zero otherwise. Tw post-multiplies
the manufacturer reaction matrix ￿wt element by element. The manufactur-
ers￿marginal costs are recovered by inverting the multiproduct manufacturer
reaction matrix ￿wt: ￿ Tw for each market t:
pw
t = mcw




The manufacturer￿ s reaction matrix is a transformation of the retailer￿ s re-
action matrix: ￿wt = ￿0
pt￿rt where ￿pt is a J-by-J matrix of the partial
derivative of each retail price with respect to each wholesale price. Each
column of ￿pt contains the entries of a response matrix computed without
observing wholesale prices. This manufacturer response matrix is derived
in Villas-Boas (2003). The (jth, kth) entry in ￿pt is the partial derivative
of the kth product￿ s retail price with respect to the jth product￿ s wholesale
price for that market. The (jth, kth) element of ￿wt is the sum of the ef-
fect of the jth product￿ s wholesale price on each of the J products￿retail











jt for m = 1;2;:::J:
The manufacturer of product j can use its estimate of the retailer￿ s re-
action function R(pj) to compute how a change in the manufacturer price
will a⁄ect the retailer price for its product. Manufacturers can assess the
impact on the vertical pro￿t, the size of the pie, as well as its share of the pie
by considering the retailer reaction function before choosing a price. Man-
ufacturers also act strategically with respect to one another. The retailer
mediates these interactions by its pass-through of a given manufacturer￿ s
price change to the product￿ s retail price. Manufacturers set prices after
considering how the retailer will pass-through any price changes to the re-
tail price, how other manufacturers will react to the retail price change, and
how consumers will react to the retail-price changes.
2.2 Demand
The marginal-cost computations done with the Bertrand-Nash supply model
require consistent estimates of demand. Market demand is derived from a
standard discrete-choice model of consumer behavior that follows the work of
Berry (1994), Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), and Nevo (2001) among
others. I use a random-coe¢ cients logit model to estimate the demand sys-
tem, as it is a very ￿ exible and general model. The pass-through coe¢ cients￿
12accuracy depends in particular on consistent estimation of the curvature of
the demand curve, that is, of the second derivative of the demand equation.
The random-coe¢ cients model imposes very few restrictions on the demand
system￿ s own- and cross-price elasticities. This ￿ exibility makes it the most
appropriate model to study exchange-rate pass-through in this market.7
Suppose consumer i chooses to purchase one unit of good j if and only if
the utility from consuming that good is as great as the utility from consum-
ing any other good. Consumer utility depends on product characteristics
and individual taste parameters: product-level market shares are derived as
the aggregate outcome of individual consumer decisions. All the parameters
of the demand system can be estimated from product-level data, that is,
from product prices, quantities, and characteristics.
Suppose we observe t=1;:::;T markets. I de￿ne a market in the next
section. Let the indirect utility for consumer i in consuming product j in
7Other possible demand models such as the multistage budgeting model or the nested
logit model do not ￿t this market particularly well. It is di¢ cult to de￿ne clear nests or
stages in beer consumption because of the high cross-price elasticities between domestic
light beers and foreign light and regular beers. When a consumer chooses to drink a light
beer that also is an import, it is not clear if he categorized beers primarily as domestic or
imported and secondarily as light or regular, or vice versa.
13market t take a quasi-linear form:
uijt = xjt￿￿￿pjt+￿jt+"ijt = Vijt+"ijt; i = 1;:::;I:; j = 1;:::;J:; t = 1;:::;T:
(8)
where "ijt is a mean-zero stochastic term: A consumer￿ s utility from con-
suming a given product is a function of a vector of individual characteristics
￿ and a vector of product characteristics (x;￿;p) where p are product prices,
x are product characteristics observed by the econometrician, the consumer,
and the producer, and ￿ are product characteristics observed by the producer
and consumer but not by the econometrician. Let the taste for certain prod-










+ ￿Di + ￿vi (9)
where Di is a vector of demographics for consumer i, ￿ is a matrix of
coe¢ cients that characterize how consumer tastes vary with demograph-
ics, vi is a vector of unobserved characteristics for consumer i, and ￿ is
a matrix of coe¢ cients that characterizes how consumer tastes vary with
their unobserved characteristics. I assume that, conditional on demograph-
ics, the distribution of consumers￿unobserved characteristics is multivari-
ate normal. The demographic draws give an empirical distribution for the
14observed consumer characteristics Di: Indirect utility can be rede￿ned in
terms of mean utility ￿jt= ￿xjt￿￿pjt+￿jt and deviations from that mean
￿ijt= [￿Di ￿vi]pjt + [￿Di ￿vi]xjt:
uijt = ￿jt + ￿ijt + "ijt (10)
Finally, consumers have the option of an outside good. Consumer i can
choose not to purchase one of the products in the sample. The price of the
outside good is assumed to be set independently of the prices observed in
the sample.8 The mean utility of the outside good is normalized to be zero
and constant over markets. The indirect utility from choosing to consume
the outside good is:
ui0t = ￿
0t + ￿0Di + ￿0vi0 + "i0t (11)
8As the manufacturers I observe supply their products to the outside market, this as-
sumption may be problematic given my data. Recent empirical work shows that consumers
rarely search over several local supermarkets to locate the lowest price for a single good.
This implies that beer in other supermarkets (the outside good in my model) is unlikely
to be priced to respond in the short run (over the course of a month) to the prices set by
Dominick￿ s. Any distortions introduced by this assumption are likely to be second order.
The inclusion of an outside good means my use of a single retailer does not require an
assumption of monopoly in the retail market. It also makes the estimates of pass-through
more credible given that the ￿rms in my sample are constrained by the availability of
goods other than those included in my sample. Even if the price of the outside good does
not respond to price changes in the sample, it regardless remains a potential choice for
consumers when faced with a price increase for products in the sample.
15Let Aj be the set of consumer traits that induce purchase of good j. The






where P￿(d￿) is the density of consumer characteristics ￿ =[D ￿] in the
population. To compute this integral, one must make assumptions about the
distribution of consumer characteristics. I report estimates from two models.
For diagnostic purposes, I initially restrict heterogeneity in consumer tastes
to enter only through the random shock "ijt which is independently and
identically distributed with a Type I extreme-value distribution. For this
model, the probability of individual i purchasing product j in market t is







where ￿jt is the mean utility common to all consumers and Jt remains the
total number of products in the market at time t.
In the full random-coe¢ cients model, I assume "ijt is i.i.d with a Type
I extreme value distribution but now allow heterogeneity in consumer pref-
erences to enter through an additional term ￿it. This allows more general
16substitution patterns among products than is permitted under the restric-
tions of the multinomial logit model. The probability of individual i pur-
chasing product j in market t must now be computed by simulation. This








k e￿kt+￿ikt f (￿it)d￿it (14)
The integral is approximated by the smooth simulator which, given a set











Given these predicted market shares, I search for demand parameters that
implicitly minimize the distance between these predicted market shares and
the observed market shares using a generalized method-of-moments (GMM)
procedure, as I discuss in further detail in the estimation section.
2.3 Counterfactual Experiments: Pass-Through Coe¢ cients
To recover exchange-rate pass-through coe¢ cients I estimate the e⁄ect of
a shock to foreign ￿rms￿marginal costs on all ￿rms￿wholesale and retail
17prices by computing a new Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Let b be a constant
between -1 and 1. Let mcw￿
jt = mcw
jt for those products that do not experience
a marginal-cost shock, domestic products, and mcw￿
jt = (1 + b)mc
w
jt for those
products that do experience a marginal-cost shock, foreign products.
Suppose an exchange-rate-induced marginal-cost shock hits the jth prod-
uct. Taking the derived value for each manufacturer￿ s marginal cost mcw￿
jt ,
let us search for a set of values for the vector pw￿













jt : Taking the derivative of
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jt￿b : The change in pw￿
jt
18for a given change in mcw
jt depends on the demand system￿ s own- and cross-
price elasticities, that is, on the manufacturer response matrix, ￿wt, the
relative market share of each good, st; the slope of the demand curve with







jt ; and the curvature of the demand
curve, @￿wt
@pw￿
jt . As a good￿ s market share rises, its pass-through should rise.
As its own-price elasticity falls in absolute value, its pass-through should
also rise.
To compute pass-through at the retail level, I substitute the derived
values of the vector pw￿
t into the system of J nonlinear equations for the
retail ￿rm, and then search for the retail price vector pr￿










which is just the ￿rst-order pro￿t-maximizing condition for the retailer. As-
suming the retailer￿ s other marginal costs mcr
jt are independent of the whole-
sale price, the change in the retail price for a given change in the wholesale



















jt depends on the retailer response matrix, ￿rt (pr￿); the market share of
19each good st(p
r￿); and the curvature of the demand curve, given by @￿rt
@pw￿
jt :
Vertical pass-through, de￿ned as pass-through along the distribution chain




jt￿b . Retail pass-through, de￿ned as
pass-through by the retailer of just those costs passed on by the manufac-









jt:Pass-through by the manufac-
turers and the retailer will depend on the market share of each good, the
curvature of the demand curve, and strategic interactions with other ￿rms.
3 Market and Data
In this section I describe the beer market my data cover. I then present
summary statistics for the data.
3.1 Market
As recently as 1970, imported beers made up less than one percent of total
U.S. beer consumption. Consumption of imported brands grew slowly in the
1980s and by double digits for each year in the 1990s resulting in a market
share of over seven percent by the end of the decade. Despite these changes,
the U.S. beer industry remains quite concentrated at the manufacturer level.
The three largest domestic brewers Anheuser-Busch (45%), Adolph Coors
(10%), and Miller Brewing (23%) together account for roughly 80 percent
20of U.S. beer sales.
Beer exempli￿es one type of imported good: packaged goods imported
for consumption. Such imports do not require any further production process
before reaching consumers. Beer shipments to supermarkets in Illinois are
handled by independent wholesale distributors for domestic brands and by
subsidiary wholesale distributors for most foreign brands. The model ab-
stracts from this additional step in the vertical chain, as the brewers set the
prices of all distributors through a practice known as resale price mainte-
nance and cover a large portion of the distributors￿marginal costs through
their pricing policies. This well-documented practice of resale-price main-
tenance makes the analysis of pricing behavior along the distribution chain
relatively straight-forward.
During the 1990s supermarkets increased the selection of beers they of-
fered as well as the total shelf space devoted to beer. A study from this
period found that beer was the tenth most frequently purchased item and
the seventh most pro￿table item for the average U.S. supermarket.9 Super-
markets sell approximately 20 percent of all beer consumed in the U.S. As
my data focus on one metropolitan statistical area, I do not need to control
for variation in retail alcohol sales regulations. Such regulations can di⁄er
9Canadian Trade Commissioner (2000).
21considerably across states.
3.2 Data
My data come from Dominick￿ s Finer Foods, the second-largest supermarket
chain in the Chicago metropolitan area in the mid 1990s with a market share
of roughly 20 percent. I have a rich scanner data set that records retail prices
for each product sold by Dominick￿ s over a period of four years. The data
come from the Kilts Center for Marketing at the University of Chicago
and include aggregate retail market shares and retail prices for 34 brands
produced by 18 manufacturers. Summary statistics for prices, servings sold,
and market shares are provided in Table 1. Of the chain￿ s 88 stores, I include
only those that report prices for the full sample period. My data contain
roughly two-thirds (56) of the chain￿ s stores.
I aggregated data from each Dominick￿ s store into one of three price
zones. These zones are de￿ned by Dominick￿ s on the basis of customer
demographics. Although they do not report these zones, I was able to
identify them through zip-code level demographics (with a few exceptions,
each Dominick￿ s store in my sample is the only store located in its zip code)
and by comparing the average prices charged for the same product across
stores. I classify each store according to its pricing behavior as a low-,
22Description Mean Median Standard Min Max
Deviation
Retail prices (cents per serving) 71.04 61.31 27.29 26.72 131.50
Market share of each product .54 .15 1.16 .00005 9.17
Servings sold 16589 4655 34800 1.83 279,918
Share of Dominick￿ s beer sales 65.04 65.89 13.96 31.58 98.20
By pricing zone:
Low 65.78 65.98 15.05 30.39 98.61
Medium 67.28 67.90 13.77 33.04 98.06
High 62.71 63.41 13.95 30.92 98.12
Market share of 34 products 18.46 17.34 7.38 7.01 36.12
By pricing zone:
Low 11.17 10.49 3.10 6.79 17.38
Medium 24.11 23.53 6.06 14.54 36.12
High 20.10 19.12 5.43 12.53 31.73
Market share of outside good 81.54 82.66 7.38 63.89 93.21
Table 1: Summary statistics for prices, servings sold, and market shares for
the 34 products in the sample. The share of Dominick￿ s total beer sales
refers to the share of revenue of the 34 products I consider in the total beer
sales by the Dominick￿ s stores in my sample. The market share refers to
the share of the product in the potential market which I de￿ne as all beer
sold at supermarkets in the zip codes in which one of the Dominick￿ s stores
in my sample is located. Source: Dominick￿ s.
23medium-, or high-price store. I then aggregate sales across the stores in
each pricing zone. Residents￿income covaries positively with retail prices
across the three zones.
I de￿ne a product as one twelve-ounce serving of a brand of beer. Quan-
tity is the total number of servings sold per month. I de￿ne a market as
one of Dominick￿ s price zones in one month. The potential market is de-
￿ned as the total beer purchased in supermarkets by the residents of the zip
codes in which each Dominick￿ s store is located. During this period, the
annual per capita consumption of beer in the U.S. was 22.60 gallons. This
implies the potential market for total beer consumption to be 20 servings
per capita per month in each pricing zone, that is: 1 gallon=128 ounces, so
(22:6￿128)
12￿12 = 20:15 servings per month. The potential market for beer sold in
supermarkets is 20 percent of the total potential market for beer sales. Each
adult consumes on average 4 servings per month that were purchased at a
supermarket. So the potential market of beer servings sold in supermarkets
is 4 multiplied by the resident adult population in each pricing zone. I de￿ne
the outside good to be all beer sold by other supermarkets to residents of
the same zip codes as well as all beer sales in the sample￿ s Dominick￿ s stores
not already included in my sample. These sales mainly consist of specialty
brands, each with a relatively small market share. The share of Dominick￿ s
24Brand Month Pricing Zone
Retail Price
Domestic (%) 87.60 2.38 .20
Imports (%) 70.64 4.07 .01
Table 2: Sources of price variation. Each column shows the percentage of
variance due to brand, month, or pricing-zone dummy variables controlling
for the e⁄ects of the variables in the remaining columns. 4080 observations.
Source: Dominick￿ s.
total revenue from beer sales included in my sample is high, with a mean of
65.04 percent, and varies only slightly across the three pricing zones. The
combined market share of products covered in the sample is on average 18.46
percent, though it is much higher in the medium and high pricing zones, at
24.11 percent and 20.10 percent, respectively, than in the low pricing zone,
where it is only 11.17 percent. Promotions occur infrequently in the Do-
minick￿ s data. Bonus-buy sales appear to be the most common promotion
used for beer which appear in the data as regular purchases.
Table 2 reports the percent of price variation attributable to brand,
month, and pricing zone dummies. After controlling for di⁄erences in prices
across price zones and over time, most of the price variation is attributable
to di⁄erences across brands.
I supplement the Dominick￿ s data with information on manufacturer
costs, product characteristics, advertising, and the distribution of consumer
demographics. Product characteristics come from the ratings of a Con-
25Description Mean Median Std Minimum Maximum
Percent Alcohol 4.52 4.60 .68 2.41 6.04
Calories 132.18 142.50 23.00 72.00 164.00
Bitterness 2.50 2.10 1.08 1.70 5.80
Maltiness 1.67 1.20 1.52 .60 7.10
Hops (=1 if yes) .12 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Sulfury/Skunky (=1 if yes) .29 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Fruity (=1 if yes) .21 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Floral (=1 if yes) .12 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Table 3: Product characteristics. Source: ￿ Beer Ratings.￿Consumer Re-
ports, June (1996), pp. 10-19.
sumer Reports study conducted in 1996. Table 3 reports summary statistics
for the following characteristics: percent alcohol, calories, bitterness, malti-
ness, hops, sulfury, fruity, and ￿ oral. Manufacturer cost data for use as
instruments come from the U.S. Department of Labor￿ s Foreign Labor Sta-
tistics Program. The joint distribution of each pricing zone￿ s residents with
respect to age and income comes from the 1990 U.S. Census. To construct
appropriate demographics for each pricing zone, I collected a sample of the
joint distribution of residents￿age and income for each zip code in which a
Dominick￿ s store was located. I then aggregated the data across each pricing
zone to get one set of demographics for each zone.
264 Estimation
This section describes the econometric procedures used to estimate the
model￿ s demand parameters.
4.1 Demand
The results depend on consistent estimates of the model￿ s demand para-
meters. Two issues arise in estimating a complete demand system in an
oligopolistic market with di⁄erentiated products: the high dimensionality of
elasticities to estimate and the potential endogeneity of price.10 Following
McFadden (1973), Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), and Nevo (2001) I
draw on the discrete-choice literature to address the ￿rst issue: I project the
products onto a characteristics space with a much smaller dimension than
the number of products. The second issue is that a product￿ s price may be
correlated with changes in its unobserved characteristics. I deal with this
second issue by instrumenting for the potential endogeneity of price. Fol-
lowing Villas-Boas (2002), I use input prices interacted with product ￿xed
e⁄ects as instruments. Input prices should be correlated with those aspects
of price that a⁄ect consumer demand but are not themselves a⁄ected by
10In an oligopolistic market with di⁄erentiated products, the number of parameters to
be estimated is proportional to the square of the number of products, which creates a
dimensionality problem given a large number of products.
27consumer demand, that is, with supply shocks.
I estimate the demand parameters by following the algorithm proposed
by Berry (1994). This algorithm uses a nonlinear generalized-method-of-
moments (GMM) procedure. The main step in the estimation is to construct
a moment condition that interacts instrumental variables and a structural er-
ror term to form a nonlinear GMM estimator. Let ￿ signify the demand-side
parameters to be estimated with ￿1 denoting the model￿ s linear parameters
and ￿2 its non-linear parameters. I compute the structural error term as a
function of the data and demand parameters by solving for the mean util-
ity levels (across the individuals sampled) that solve the implicit system of
equations:
st (xt;pt;￿tj￿2) = St (21)
where St are the observed market shares and st (xt;pt:￿tj￿2) is the market-
share function de￿ned in equation (15). For the logit model, this is given by
the di⁄erence between the log of a product￿ s observed market share and the
log of the outside good￿ s observed market share: ￿jt = log(Sjt) ￿ log(S0t).
For the full random-coe¢ cients model, it is computed by simulation.11
Following this inversion, one relates the recovered mean utility from con-
suming product j in market t to its price, pjt, its constant observed and
11See Nevo (2000b) for details.
28unobserved product characteristics, dj; and the error term ￿￿jt which now
contains changes in unobserved product characteristics:
￿￿jt = ￿jt ￿ ￿jdj ￿ ￿pjt (22)
I use brand ￿xed e⁄ects as product characteristics following Nevo (2001).
The product ￿xed e⁄ects dj proxy for the observed characteristics term xj in
equation (8) and mean unobserved characteristics. The mean utility term
here denotes the part of the indirect utility expression in equation (10) that
does not vary across consumers.
4.2 Instruments
The moment condition discussed above requires an instrument that is cor-
related with product-level prices pjt but not with changes in unobserved
product characteristics ￿￿jt to achieve identi￿cation of the model. While I
observe national promotional activity by brand, I do not observe local pro-
motional activity. It follows that the residual ￿￿jt likely contains changes
in products￿perceived characteristics that are stimulated by local promo-
tional activity. For example, an increase in the mean utility from consuming
product j caused by a rise in product j￿ s unobserved promotional activity
should cause a rightward shift in product j￿ s demand curve and, thus, a rise
29in its retail price. Therefore, the residual will be correlated with the price
and (nonlinear) least squares will yield inconsistent estimates.
The solution to this endogeneity problem is to introduce a set of j instru-
mental variables zjt that are orthogonal to the error term ￿￿jt of interest.
The population moment condition requires that the variables zjt be orthog-
onal to those unobserved changes in product characteristics stimulated by
local advertising.
I use the prices of inputs in the brewing process as instruments. In-
put prices should be correlated with the retail price, which a⁄ects consumer
demand, but are not themselves correlated with unobserved characteristics
that enter the consumer demand. Input prices like wages are unlikely to
have any relationship to the types of promotional activity that will stimu-
late perceived changes in the characteristics of the sample￿ s products. My
instruments are hourly compensation in local currency terms for production
workers in Food, Beverage and Tobacco Manufacturing Industries. These
annual ￿gures come from the Foreign Labor Statistics Program of the U.S.
Department of Labor￿ s Bureau of Labor Statistics. I interact the hourly com-
pensation variables, which vary by country and year, with indicator variables
for each brand following Villas-Boas (2003). This allows each product￿ s price
to respond independently to a given supply shock.
30One might expect foreign wages to be ￿ weakly￿correlated with domes-
tic retail prices, thus generating a weak instrumental variables problem.12
Given the well-known border e⁄ect on prices we should expect a somewhat
weaker relationship between wages and prices for foreign products than for
domestic products.13 The model￿ s ￿rst-stage results, reported in Table 4,
indicate that foreign products￿input prices appear to be e⁄ective as instru-
ments. I discuss these results further in the next section.
5 Results
5.1 Demand Estimation: Logit Demand
Tables 4 and 5 report results from estimation of demand using the multino-
mial logit model. Due to its restrictive functional form, this model will not
produce credible estimates of pass-through. However, it is helpful to see
how well the instruments for price perform in the logit demand estimation
before turning to the full random-coe¢ cients model. Table 4 reports the
￿rst-stage results for demand. Most of the coe¢ cients have the expected
sign: as hourly compensation increases, the retail price of each product
12Staiger and Stock (1997) examine the properties of the IV estimator in the presence
of weak instruments.





Beck￿ s -.0063 -.46
Budweiser .1218 3.44
Bud Light .1710 4.10
Busch .1464 1.66
Busch Light .0793 1.04
Coors .1598 3.86
Coors Light .0039 .09
Corona -.0001 -2.44





Keystone Light -.0143 -.50
Michelob Light .6118 7.63
Miller Genuine Draft .1827 6.31
Miller High Life .0702 2.05
Miller Lite .1925 6.71
Milwaukee￿ s Best .5678 8.92
Milwaukee￿ s Best Light .3147 4.37
Molson Golden .1216 .85
Molson Light .1869 1.22
Old Milwaukee -.3186 -7.72
Old Style .2595 3.99
Old Style Classic -.1666 -3.32
Peroni .0001 1.81
Rolling Rock .7274 7.69
Sapporo -.0014 -1.00
Special Export .2750 2.96
St. Pauli -.1472 -3.18
Stroh￿ s -.0753 -1.11
Tecate .0002 7.21
Table 4: First-stage results for demand. Hourly compensation in local cur-
rency terms for the food, beverage, and tobacco manufacturing industries.
T-statistics are based on Huber-White robust standard errors. The depen-
dent variable is the retail price for each brand in each month and each price
zone. The regression also includes brand dummy variables. 4080 observa-
tions. Sources: My calculations; Foreign Labor Statistics Program, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor.
32Variable OLS IV
Price -5.62 -5.62 -8.34 -8.32 .




Adjusted R2 .86 .86
Price Exogeneity Test 10.28 10.13
95% Critical Value (3.84) (3.84)
Overidenti￿cation Test 11.56 11.60
95% Critical Value (45) (45)
First-Stage Results
F-Statistic 17.42 17.40
Partial R2 .98 .97
Instruments wages wages
Table 5: Diagnostic results from the logit model of demand. Dependent
variable is ln(Sjt) ￿ ln(Sot). All four regressions include brand dummy vari-
ables. Based on 4080 observations. Huber-White robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Wages denote a measure of hourly compensation
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics which is described in the text. Ad-
vertising is the annual amount spent on advertising for each brand across all
potential media outlets. Sources: Competitive Media Reporting, 1991-1995;
My calculations.
should increase. T-statistics calculated using Huber-White robust standard
errors indicate that most of the coe¢ cients are signi￿cant at the 5-percent
level. The negative coe¢ cients on some variables likely result from collinear-
ity between some of the regressors. The ￿rst-stage F-test of the instruments,
at 17.42, is signi￿cant at the 1-percent level.
Table 5 suggests the instruments may have some power. The consumer￿ s
33sensitivity to price should increase after I instrument for unobserved changes
in characteristics. That is, consumers should appear more sensitive to price
once I instrument for the impact of unobserved (by the econometrician,
not by ￿rms or consumers) changes in product characteristics on their con-
sumption choices. It is promising that the price coe¢ cient falls from -5.62
in the OLS estimation to -8.34 in the IV estimation. The second and fourth
columns of Table 5 include brand-level national advertising expenditure in
the estimation. Although signed as expected, at .17 in the OLS estimation
and .16 in the IV estimation, the advertising coe¢ cient is highly insigni￿-
cant. The brand-level ￿xed e⁄ects likely capture those aspects of consumer
taste that are stimulated by national advertising. The Hausman exogeneity
test for the price variable, at 10.28, is signi￿cant at the 1-percent level. A
Hausman test of overidentifying restrictions fails to reject this speci￿cation.
It returns a value of 11.56, far below the critical value of 45 that must be
surpassed to fail the test.
5.2 Demand: Random-Coe¢ cients Model
Table 6 reports results from estimation of the demand equation (22). I allow
consumers￿age and income to interact with their taste coe¢ cients for price
and percent alcohol. As I estimate the demand equation using product ￿xed




Price -21.743 1.407 3.157 .280







Percent Alcohol -1.59 .028 -.143 -.014










M-D Weighted R2 .46
Table 6: Results from the full random-coe¢ cients model of demand. Based
on 4080 observations. Starred coe¢ cients are signi￿cant at the 5-percent
level. Asymptotically robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: My
calculations.
35e⁄ects, I recover the consumer taste coe¢ cients in a generalized-least-squares
regression of the estimated product ￿xed e⁄ects on product characteristics.
This GLS regression assumes that changes in brands￿unobserved character-
istics ￿￿ are independent of changes in brands￿observed characteristics x:
E (￿￿jx) = 0:
The coe¢ cients on the characteristics appear reasonable. As consumers￿
age and income rise, they become less price sensitive. The coe¢ cients on
age, at 3.16, and on income, at .28, are signi￿cant at the 5-percent level. The
mean preference in the population is in favor of a bitter and hoppy taste in
beer. Both characteristics have positive and highly signi￿cant coe¢ cients.
The mean preference in the population is quite averse to sweet, fruity, or
malty ￿ avors in beer. All three have negative coe¢ cients, with the former
two highly signi￿cant. As the percent alcohol rises, the mean utility in the
population falls. This result appears reasonable once one considers that
identi￿cation here comes from the variation in percent alcohol between light
and regular beers. As light beers sell at a premium, there clearly is some gain
in utility from less alcohol within a given range. I do not consider nonalco-
holic beers in this sample, so the choice of no alcohol is not re￿ ected in this
coe¢ cient. Calories have a negative sign, as one would expect, though the
coe¢ cient is not signi￿cant. Finally, an indicator variable for poor quality,
36the ￿ Sulfury/Skunky￿characteristic, has a large, negative, and highly sig-
ni￿cant coe¢ cient as one would expect. The minimum-distance weighted R2
is .46 indicating these characteristics explain the variation in the estimated
product ￿xed e⁄ects fairly well.
Table 7 reports the median own-price elasticities for the 34 products in
the sample. Own-price elasticities are also reported for each pricing zone.
Residents from the low-price zone have much higher demand elasticities in
absolute value than do residents from the medium- and high-price zones,
whose elasticities are virtually indistinguishable. The variation in the de-
mand elasticities across the pricing zones is striking. The marginal utility
of income, the coe¢ cient on the price variable, appears quite high in the
low-price zone. There is also considerable heterogeneity in the taste for
foreign brands across the zones. Demand elasticities are much higher in ab-
solute value for imported beers than for domestic beers in the low-price zone.
This pattern is reversed in the medium- and high-price zones, where a› uent
consumers are willing to pay more for imported brands. The demand elas-
ticities for foreign brands in the low-price zone are more than twice as large
(in absolute value) as the demand elasticities for the same products in the
medium- and high-price zones. The demand elasticity for Amstel is -4.73
in the medium-price zone, -5.26 in the high-price zone, and -11.65 in the
37Product Elasticities By Zone:
Low Medium High
Domestic Brands
Budweiser -6.37 -7.645 -5.926 -5.956
Bud Light -5.88 -7.636 -5.486 -5.571
Busch -6.49 -7.630 -6.163 -6.038
Busch Light -6.02 -7.015 -5.708 -5.626
Coors -6.34 -7.627 -5.921 -5.922
Coors Light -5.99 -7.494 -5.552 -5.598
Keystone -5.85 -6.512 -5.723 -5.418
Michelob Light -6.05 -8.154 -5.361 -5.611
Miller Genuine Draft -5.91 -7.285 -5.573 -5.582
Miller High Life -6.49 -7.712 -6.046 -6.080
Miller Lite -5.61 -7.091 -5.276 -5.355
Milwaukee￿ s Best -6.09 -6.770 -5.901 -5.741
Milwaukee￿ s Best Light -6.27 -7.328 -5.877 -5.852
Old Milwaukee -4.75 -5.562 -4.581 -4.325
Old Style -6.25 -8.160 -5.777 -5.897
Old Style Classic -6.21 -7.173 -5.874 -5.867
Rolling Rock -5.95 -8.688 -5.080 -5.461
Special Export -6.25 -8.458 -5.730 -5.992
Stroh￿ s -6.11 -6.957 -5.852 -5.629
European Brands
Beck￿ s -5.71 -10.478 -4.657 -5.120
St. Pauli -6.31 -11.760 -5.045 -5.603
Amstel -6.06 -11.649 -4.729 -5.259
Grolsch -6.70 -12.258 -5.091 -5.797
Heineken -6.12 -11.440 -4.900 -5.378
Harp -6.70 -12.928 -5.091 -5.536
Peroni -6.06 -10.861 -4.845 -5.281
Bass -6.85 -12.830 -5.172 -5.741
North American Brands
Foster￿ s -6.39 -12.054 -4.991 -5.607
Guinness -6.67 -13.411 -5.132 -5.623
Molson Golden -6.73 -9.923 -5.620 -6.111
Molson Light -5.21 -9.152 -4.323 -4.649
Corona -6.04 -10.847 -4.814 -5.261
Tecate -5.97 -10.947 -4.764 -5.305
Japanese Brands
Sapporo -6.22 -12.040 -4.877 -5.443
Table 7: Median own-price demand elasticities. Median across all 120 mar-
kets. 95 percent con￿dence intervals generated with bootstrap simulations.
4080 observations. Source: My calculations.
38Brand Amstel Beck￿ s Bud Bud L Corona Heineken Miller HL
Amstel -6.06 .0162 .0058 .0075 .0163 .0168 .0054
Beck￿ s .1437 -5.71 .0528 .0684 .1320 .1356 .0506
Bud .1299 .1359 -6.37 .1560 .1413 .1345 .1511
Bud Light .0977 .1005 .0853 -5.88 .0986 .0992 .0827
Corona .0717 .0673 .0263 .0334 -6.04 .0693 .0261
Heineken .1309 .1236 .0464 .0601 .1276 -6.12 .0453
Miller HL .0843 .0910 .1015 .1041 .0915 .0895 -6.49
Table 8: A sample of median own- and cross-price demand elasticities. Cell
entries i, j, where i indexes row and j column, give the percent change in
the market share of brand j given a 1-percent change in the price of brand
i. Each entry reports the median of the elasticities from the 120 markets.
Source: My calculations.
low-price zone. A domestic sub-premium beer like Keystone Light exhibits
less variation in its demand elasticities across the price zones: the median
demand elasticities for this brand are -6.51, -5.72, and ￿ 5.42 in the low-,
medium- and high-price zones, respectively.
Table 8 reports a sample of the median own- and cross-price elasticities
for several brands. The cross-price elasticities are generally intuitive. The
cross-price elasticities are higher between imported brands than between
imported and domestic brands. A change in the price of Amstel, from Hol-
land, has a greater impact on the market share of other imported brands
such as Heineken at .0168 or Beck￿ s at .0162 than on such domestic brands
as Miller High Life at .0054. The cross-price elasticities between a domes-
tic premium light beer such as Bud Light and an import such as Beck￿ s at
39.1005 or Corona at .0986 are higher than those between Bud Light and the
domestic brands Bud at .0853 or Miller High Life at .0827.
Table 9 reports the retail price, the derived wholesale price, and the de-
rived manufacturer marginal cost for each brand. Again, the results appear
intuitive. Manufacturer marginal costs are roughly 20 cents higher for im-
ported brands at 47 cents than for domestic brands at 27 cents, which likely
re￿ ects the cost of transporting the products from the foreign production
site to the U.S. market. The median wholesale price for foreign brands, 71
cents, is nearly twice that of domestic brands, at 36 cents. (consistent with
industry lore) The median retail price is 100 cents for imported brands and
49 cents for domestic brands.
Table 10 reports markups by brand. The median retail markup for
domestic brands is 12 cents while for imported brands it is over twice that
at 29 cents. Markups at the manufacturer level are somewhat lower: the
median domestic markup is 9 cents and the median foreign markup is 20
cents. Markups are generally higher for light beers than for regular beers,
consistent with industry lore. As reported in an appendix table, price-
cost margins vary less across brands than do markups but exhibit similar
qualitative patterns.
Figure 2 compares the observed and derived exchange rate over the sam-
40Product Retail Wholesale Manufacturer
Price Price Marginal Cost
Domestic Brands
Budweiser 51.14 37.22 28.84
Bud Light 53.17 37.27 27.61
Busch 47.21 35.58 26.87
Busch Light 43.48 31.61 23.49
Coors 49.06 35.37 27.10
Coors Light 51.69 35.98 27.18
Keystone 35.37 25.95 19.24
Michelob Light 59.25 41.63 30.54
Miller Genuine Draft 51.18 37.33 29.00
Miller High Life 50.99 37.44 28.21
Miller Lite 51.07 36.56 27.57
Milwaukee￿ s Best 37.55 28.29 19.67
Milwaukee￿ s Best Lite 47.63 35.04 25.08
Old Milwaukee 32.61 21.46 14.04
Old Style 59.28 42.25 31.59
Old Style Classic 45.52 34.31 26.07
Rolling Rock 71.35 46.77 33.09
Special Export 60.87 43.95 32.98
Stroh￿ s 40.38 30.14 22.84
All Domestic Brands 48.97 36.03 26.94
European Brands
Beck￿ s 88.23 61.22 40.05
St. Pauli 106.83 72.05 48.82
Amstel 99.05 68.80 44.01
Grolsch 111.28 81.31 56.82
Heineken 99.08 69.08 45.22
Harp 116.50 81.08 56.89
Peroni 96.75 65.93 44.12
Bass 111.38 83.15 57.53
North American Brands
Foster￿ s 105.72 75.27 51.09
Guinness 117.10 84.50 58.93
Molson Golden 76.19 54.77 41.17
Molson Light 75.89 51.71 30.48
Corona 96.75 65.82 43.96
Tecate 96.28 63.09 40.60
Japanese Brands
Sapporo 106.43 75.05 49.75
All Foreign Brands 99.99 70.67 46.86
Table 9: Prices and marginal costs for the 34 products in the sample. Median






Budweiser 8.59 13.42 22.01
Bud Light 9.65 15.30 24.95
Busch 8.27 11.52 19.79
Busch Light 7.97 11.46 19.43
Coors 8.28 12.98 21.26
Coors Light 9.16 14.20 23.36
Keystone 6.37 9.30 15.67
Michelob Light 10.61 17.57 28.18
Miller Genuine Draft 8.98 13.29 22.27
Miller High Life 9.66 13.38 23.04
Miller Lite 9.46 14.12 23.59
Milwaukee￿ s Best 7.94 9.30 17.24
Milwaukee￿ s Best Lite 9.77 12.89 22.66
Old Milwaukee 7.18 10.78 17.97
Old Style 10.04 15.44 25.48
Old Style Classic 7.61 11.34 18.95
Rolling Rock 11.95 19.70 31.65
Special Export 10.59 17.16 27.75
Stroh￿ s 7.13 10.69 17.83
All Domestic Brands 8.72 12.31 21.10
European Brands
Beck￿ s 19.64 28.28 47.92
St. Pauli 19.96 29.88 49.84
Amstel 22.23 29.59 51.83
Grolsch 24.43 31.11 55.54
Heineken 20.70 28.40 49.11
Harp 23.86 31.22 55.08
Peroni 19.23 28.60 47.83
Bass 23.88 31.28 55.16
Other Foreign Brands
Foster￿ s 22.45 30.25 42.71
Guinness 25.10 31.93 57.03
Molson Golden 12.73 21.31 34.04
Molson Light 18.32 27.85 46.17
Corona 19.36 28.76 48.11
Tecate 17.79 27.69 45.48
Sapporo 24.11 30.87 54.98
All Foreign Brands 19.91 28.57 49.75
Table 10: Median derived price-cost markups by product. Median across 120
markets. The markup is price less marginal cost with units in cents per 12-ounce


































































Figure 2. A comparison of observed and derived exchange rates. The derived exchange rate is
a 12-month moving average and is the broken line in each ﬁgure. The time period is from July
1992 to December 1994. Source: My calculations: IMF.ple period for most of the countries in the sample. The derived exchange
rates are 12-month moving averages to remove seasonal ￿ uctuations. The
high correlation between the two variables suggests that the structural model
captures exchange-rate movements for each of the sample￿ s countries fairly
well. Similarly, the correlation between the observed and the derived whole-
sale price is 87 percent across all brands.
6 Counterfactual Experiments
Using the full random-coe¢ cients model and the derived marginal costs I
conduct counterfactual experiments to analyze how ￿rms and consumers re-
act to changes in the exchange rate. This section presents and discusses
the results from these experiments. First, I consider the e⁄ect of vari-
ous exchange-rate changes on foreign brands￿prices and price-cost margins.
Second, I examine the e⁄ect of a 10-percent depreciation on domestic and
foreign ￿rms￿markups, quantities sold, and total variable pro￿ts. Finally, I
quantify how a variation in ￿rms￿pass-through behavior impacts the change
in ￿rms￿pro￿ts and in consumer welfare following a 10-percent depreciation.
436.1 Foreign Brands￿Pass-Through
The ￿rst counterfactual experiments consider how foreign manufacturers and
the retailer adjust their prices following a 10-percent change in the nominal
exchange rate. The second column of Table 11 reports each brand￿ s vertical
pass-through: the manufacturer￿ s and retailer￿ s joint pass-through of the
original shock to the retail price. The ￿rst column reports manufacturers￿
pass-through of the exchange-rate shock to the wholesale price. The last
column reports the retailer￿ s pass-through of a wholesale-price change to
the retail price.
I ￿nd some variation in ￿rms￿pass-through across brands. The median
vertical pass-through of a 10-percent depreciation ranges from 28.15 percent
for Grolsch to 78.68 percent for Molson Golden. The results are generally
consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model discussed in section
2. The model predicts that as a brand￿ s market share rises, its pass-through
of an exchange-rate shock should also rise. The foreign brands with the high-
est market shares, Guinness, Heineken, Amstel Light and Molson Golden,
are generally those with the highest pass-through.
A good example of how the own- and cross-price elasticities can work at
cross purposes is Molson Light. Though Molson Light has a very low demand
elasticity, its cross-price elasticities with respect to other foreign brands
44Wholesale Vertical Retail
Amstel 75.84 61.31 81.46
59:99￿86:66 45:65￿68:87 78:91￿85:03
Bass 75.96 57.15 77.40
72:55￿83:08 50:31￿60:84 74:96￿78:43
Beck￿ s 65.03 57.92 85.37
44:52￿81:91 37:10￿71:64 84:03￿87:01
Corona 71.20 59.67 85.22
52:84￿84:80 42:54￿72:75 83:06￿86:33
Foster￿ s 71.76 51.76 75.87
61:84￿80:79 44:05￿60:24 74:33￿78:58
Grolsch 52.78 28.15 66.15
48:39￿59:42 22:33￿36:15 60:92￿70:49
Guinness 85.13 64.45 79.17
72:46￿89:44 55:30￿72:86 76:88￿80:91
Harp 64.89 43.37 67.57
58:57￿74:78 36:26￿50:13 65:70￿72:94
Heineken 76.40 62.57 85.27
84:42￿55:86 43:66￿72:32 83:72￿86:72
Molson G 80.22 78.68 94.72
75:49￿86:94 69:80￿85:92 92:67￿98:46
Molson L 52.78 30.47 80.23
28:56￿70:97 14:95￿49:22 75:83￿83:62
Peroni 71.87 60.58 85.10
52:71￿84:85 42:62￿73:25 83:18￿86:41
Sapporo 57.48 33.97 67.36
51:55￿65:73 29:47￿41:45 64:50￿70:23
St. Pauli 78.12 57.65 80.40
59:25￿85:18 43:55￿67:28 78:06￿82:98
Tecate 54.31 32.75 78.32
33:02￿71:76 20:20￿46:03 71:29￿82:66
Table 11: Counterfactual experiments: median pass-through of a 10-percent
exchange-rate depreciation with 95% con￿dence intervals. Median over 120
markets. Vertical pass-through: the retail price￿ s percent change for a given percent
change in the exchange rate. Manufacturer pass-through: the wholesale price￿ s
percent change for a given percent change in the exchange rate. Retail pass-through:
the retail price￿ s percent change for a given percent change in the wholesale price.
95% con￿dence intervals calculated with bootstrap simulations reported under each
coe¢ cient. Source: My calculations.
45Wholesale Vertical Retail
Appreciation
Amstel 67.49 58.52 82.69
62:53￿80:91 51:28￿63:26 79:13￿85:34
Bass 73.04 64.02 82.26
69:58￿80:20 55:52￿66:97 80:04￿84:77
Beck￿ s 65.39 53.42 82.33
57:45￿74:20 43:18￿58:22 80:02￿84:19
Corona 66.63 55.91 82.25
61:39￿75:14 50:12￿61:76 79:58￿84:25
Foster￿ s 72.95 57.19 80.35
65:83￿82:49 49:05￿66:31 77:10￿81:43
Grolsch 66.09 47.69 73.50
60:62￿79:48 40:41￿62:03 67:90￿79:17
Guinness 72.95 60.43 82.82
67:79￿77:25 57:13￿64:00 78:88￿84:50
Harp 71.41 56.24 77.75
63:32￿83:03 47:57￿64:70 74:70￿81:82
Heineken 68.10 56.27 81.89
62:73￿79:37 48:80￿61:55 79:70￿84:57
Molson G 92.05 63.52 88.73
79:03￿105:21 51:33￿76:18 74:61￿91:87
Molson L 73.53 51.80 79.92
58:12￿88:39 42:79￿65:65 75:18￿82:57
Peroni 67.07 56.17 82.56
62:16￿76:20 50:29￿62:06 79:94￿84:39
Sapporo 67.53 51.83 76.49
60:69￿79:71 44:98￿60:46 68:44￿81:21
St. Pauli 71.76 61.20 84.22
64:67￿84:90 54:68￿72:79 80:74￿85:42
Tecate 72.24 54.34 81.33
63:35￿87:76 45:98￿65:34 71:65￿84:36
Table 12: Counterfactual experiments: median pass-through of a 10-percent
exchange-rate appreciation with 95% con￿dence intervals. Median over 120
markets. Vertical pass-through: the retail price￿ s percent change for a given percent
change in the exchange rate. Manufacturer pass-through: the wholesale price￿ s
percent change for a given percent change in the exchange rate. Retail pass-through:
the retail price￿ s percent change for a given percent change in the wholesale price.
95% con￿dence intervals calculated with bootstrap simulations reported under each
coe¢ cient. Source: My calculations.
46are unusually high. As a result, its median vertical pass-through of 30.47
percent, median manufacturer pass-through of 52.78 percent, and median
retail pass-through of 80.23 percent following a 10-percent depreciation are
low compared to the median across foreign brands. Molson Light￿ s low pass-
through indicates that its cross-price elasticity e⁄ect dominates its own-price
elasticity e⁄ect.
6.2 Foreign Brands￿Margin Adjustment
Table 13 reports how foreign brands￿price-cost margins adjust following
an exchange-rate shock. Foreign manufacturers￿ price-cost margins vary
by more than do the retailer￿ s price-cost margins on foreign brands. The
median decline in foreign manufacturers￿margins is 10.5 percent following
a 10-percent depreciation: the median decline in the retailer￿ s margins on
foreign brands is only 5.9 percent. The median rise in foreign manufacturers￿
margins following a 10-percent appreciation is 13 percent: the median rise
in the retailer￿ s margins on foreign brands is only 3.81 percent. Foreign
manufacturers appear to bear more of the cost (or reap more of the bene￿t)
of a change in the nominal exchange rate than the retailer.
47Product Vertical Retail Wholesale
Depreciation
Amstel -6.00 -4.76 -8.80
Bass -7.42 -6.33 -10.48
Beck￿ s -4.39 -3.77 -8.28
Corona -4.74 -4.20 -7.62
Foster￿ s -8.31 -5.97 -11.85
Grolsch -10.68 -7.91 -20.24
Guinness -6.47 -6.70 -7.38
Harp -8.96 -8.11 -14.19
Heineken -4.65 -4.75 -7.71
Molson G -3.22 -1.63 -7.63
Molson L -6.75 -4.81 -12.52
Peroni -4.76 -4.17 -7.75
Sapporo -8.98 -7.04 -15.36
St. Pauli -6.85 -5.86 -10.67
Tecate -8.17 -5.87 -14.62
Appreciation
Amstel 9.79 4.29 12.22
Bass 8.56 4.48 12.63
Beck￿ s 12.63 2.95 18.69
Corona 10.27 3.81 15.43
Foster￿ s 9.24 3.76 14.27
Grolsch 10.02 4.08 15.18
Guinness 8.11 4.68 13.07
Harp 7.48 4.53 11.98
Heineken 12.00 4.41 18.19
Molson G 31.34 -.49 11.93
Molson L 8.43 2.65 10.37
Peroni 10.43 3.57 16.21
Sapporo 8.37 4.44 14.81
St. Pauli 6.78 3.00 12.55
Tecate 8.57 2.14 11.06
Table 13: Counterfactual experiments: changes in price-cost margins follow-
ing an exchange-rate shock. Median percent change in price-cost margins given
the percent change in the exchange rate. Source: My calculations.
486.3 Are Imports Di⁄erent?
Table 14 considers how domestic manufacturers and the retailer pass through
a 10-percent rise in their marginal costs to their prices. The question this
table addresses is whether the pass-through patterns we observe for foreign
brands resemble those of domestic brands. Previous work on pass-through
did not model the pricing decision of the retailer, and thus implicitly as-
sumed that manufacturers￿interactions with downstream ￿rms did not mat-
ter. My ￿ndings suggest that the retailer plays an important role by absorb-
ing part of an exchange-rate-induced marginal-cost shock before it reaches
consumers. I ￿nd that the retailer almost fully passes through wholesale-
price increases on domestic brands but only partially passes through identi-
cal price increases on foreign brands.
Domestic manufacturers￿median wholesale pass-through is 77 percent:
foreign manufacturers￿median pass-through is 71 percent following a 10-
percent depreciation. The retailer￿ s median pass-through on domestic brands
is 91 percent and 80 percent on foreign brands following a 10-percent de-
preciation. The retailer￿ s markups on foreign brands are roughly three
times its markups on domestic brands: the retailer may regard these higher
markups as compensation for their greater ￿ uctuation over time. The ￿rst
two columns of Table 15 suggest that the retailer does shrink its pro￿ts by







































































































































Table 14: Pass-through of a marginal-cost shock faced only by domestic
brewers. Percent change in price given a 10-percent change in marginal costs. Median pass-through over all
120 markets for each product. 4080 observations. Vertical pass-through: pass-through of the original shock to the
consumer. Manufacturer pass-through: pass-through of the shock to its wholesale price. Retailer pass-through:
pass-through to the retail price of only those costs passed on to it by the manufacturer. These measures are
described further in the text. 95% con￿dence intervals calculated with bootstrap simulations are reported under
each coe¢ cient. Source: My calculations.
50Product Pro￿t Quantity Markup
Manufacturer Retail Manufacturer Retail
Domestic Brands
Budweiser .55 -5.25 -.26 1.34 -.55
Bud Light 7.74 4.94 6.34 -1.54 -1.54
Busch -4.34 -11.15 -6.40 6.13 .45
Busch Light -4.34 -11.35 -5.37 3.74 .18
Coors -.98 -9.00 -7.60 3.32 -.16
Coors Light 3.92 -.06 2.08 .32 -.77
Keystone -8.20 -21.36 -16.88 13.06 2.17
Michelob Light 15.28 16.64 14.91 -6.43 -3.36
Miller Genuine Draft .76 -5.56 .30 .85 -.57
Miller High Life 6.03 2.74 6.84 -2.30 -1.55
Miller Lite 4.43 -.06 3.01 .30 -1.10
Milwaukee￿ s Best -15.31 -24.15 -15.46 11.90 -2.18
Milwaukee￿ s Best Lite 2.78 .54 6.45 -2.76 -1.51
Old Milwaukee -5.63 -14.91 -9.17 7.50 1.22
Old Style -.03 8.63 12.03 4.27 -2.41
Old Style Classic -5.25 -15.14 -6.71 5.11 .61
Rolling Rock 27.12 29.31 24.26 -7.50 -5.78
Special Export 13.48 13.71 16.02 -5.61 -3.40
Stroh￿ s -6.50 -16.42 -10.45 8.47 1.87
All Domestic Brands 1.70 -3.65 -.24 1.56 -.70
European Brands
Beck￿ s -23.60 -16.26 -28.70 -1.83 -1.69
St. Pauli -10.22 -14.96 -25.44 -9.35 -4.66
Amstel -13.64 -12.36 -25.43 -8.19 -3.61
Grolsch -4.44 -16.93 -22.90 -16.97 -3.26
Heineken -23.81 -13.25 -27.78 -2.37 -1.72
Harp -4.44 -31.42 -24.20 -13.38 -3.85
Peroni -24.22 -18.74 -28.96 -2.96 -1.99
Bass -18.55 -30.94 -27.17 -10.58 -3.98
Other Foreign Brands
Foster￿ s -14.78 -18.27 -25.08 -13.25 -3.75
Guinness -22.35 -33.64 -30.40 -6.11 -3.36
Molson Golden -33.75 -25.04 -36.71 -1.60 2.25
Molson Light -4.40 -.19 -18.87 -10.09 -4.02
Corona -24.95 -20.55 -28.49 -2.52 -2.03
Tecate -10.58 -13.55 -21.04 -11.88 -3.28
Sapporo 1.66 -10.47 -21.97 -13.12 -3.93
All Foreign Brands -22.12 -18.49 -25.74 -8.69 -2.54
Table 15: Percent changes in total variable pro￿ts, quantities, and markups
after a 10% depreciation. Percent change in total pro￿ts aggregated over all
markets. Median percent change in total quantity sold and in the product markup
over all markets. 4080 observations.
51more than does the foreign manufacturer in some cases. This table reports
the equilibrium e⁄ects of a 10-percent depreciation on ￿rms￿total variable
pro￿ts, price-cost markups, and quantities sold. The ￿rst two columns give
the percent change by brand in manufacturer and retailer total variable prof-
its following the depreciation. The third column gives the median percent
change in the quantity sold by brand, and the last two columns the median
percent change in the manufacturer and retailer markup by brand.
The retailer￿ s pro￿ts shrink by the most for those brands with high price-
cost markups such as Grolsch, Corona, or Harp. In the case of Grolsch,
the retailer￿ s pro￿ts shrink by 17 percent while the manufacturer￿ s pro￿ts
shrink by 4.5 percent following the shock. For Corona and Harp, the re-
tailer￿ s pro￿ts shrink by 21 percent and 31 percent, respectively, while the
manufacturer￿ s pro￿ts shrink by 25 percent and 4.4 percent, respectively.
The retailer markup on foreign brands tends to be much higher than the
wholesale markup, as Table 12 indicates. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 15
seem to indicate that the retailer loses a greater share of its pro￿t than
does the manufacturer following the depreciation. The retailer￿ s pro￿ts on
import-competing domestic brands increase following the shock: Bud Light
by 5 percent, Michelob Light by 17 percent, and Rolling Rock by 29 percent.
The retailer￿ s choice to sell both domestic and foreign brands enables it to
52minimize the pro￿t loss following the exchange-rate-induced cost shock by
selling more domestic brands.7
6.4 Adjustment in Domestic and Foreign Firms￿Pro￿ts
Comparing the ￿rst two columns of Table 15 to the last three columns gives
some indication of the underlying causes of variation in a brand￿ s total prof-
its: changes in the quantity sold or changes in the markup. The results
indicate that declines in foreign brands￿pro￿ts result more from declines in
quantities sold than from declines in markups. Those foreign manufactur-
ers who shrink their markups by more than foreign brands￿median markup
shrinkage of 8.69 percent lose less total pro￿ts than the foreign brands￿
median loss of 22.12 percent. By shrinking their markups somewhat ag-
gressively, these foreign manufacturers lose less market share than foreign
brands￿median loss of 25.74 percent. The four brands with the smallest
percent declines in manufacturer pro￿ts, Sapporo, Molson Light, Grolsch,
and Harp, 1.66 percent, 4.40 percent, 4.44 percent, and 4.44 percent, re-
spectively, are also the brands with the largest percent declines in their
markups: 13.12 percent, 10.09 percent, 16.97 percent, and 13.38 percent,
respectively, and the smallest percent decline in their quantities sold: 21.97
percent, 18.97 percent, 22.90 percent, and 24.20 percent, respectively.
536.5 Domestic Versus Foreign Manufacturers
The results suggest some strategic interaction between import-competing
domestic manufacturers and foreign manufacturers following a depreciation:
these domestic manufacturers increase their pro￿ts by lowering prices to
take market share from foreign manufacturers. Domestic manufacturers￿
pro￿ts increase by 1.7 percent following a 10-percent depreciation, mainly
from increases in market share rather than from increases in markups. The
domestic brands with increased pro￿ts are the light or superpremium brands
that compete most directly with imported beers.14 As Column 1 of Table
15 shows, only superpremium or light beers￿pro￿ts rise signi￿cantly: Bud
Light by 7.74 percent, Michelob Light by 15.28 percents, Rolling Rock by
27.12 percent, and Special Export by 13.48 percent. Manufacturer pro￿ts
increase by more than 1 percent for Bud Light, Coors Light, Michelob Light,
Miller High Life, Miller Lite, Milwaukee￿ s Best Light, Rolling Rock, and
Special Export. The pro￿ts of such sub-premium beers as Busch or Old
Milwaukee change by very little or decline slightly. Those brands in the sub-
premium segment of the market are considered poor substitutes for foreign
brands and so have little to gain from shrinking markups to try to capture
14Table ?? classi￿es the domestic brands in the Dominick￿ s data according to their
market segment: subpremium, premium, or superpremium.
54Post-Depreciation Equilibrium Percent Change
Retailer Pro￿t -5.04
Domestic Manufacturer Pro￿t 1.71
Foreign Manufacturer Pro￿t -22.12
Consumer Surplus -8.18
Total Domestic Welfare -2.85
Table 16: Percent changes in variable pro￿ts and consumer surplus following
a 10% depreciation. 4080 observations. Source: My calculations.
market share following a depreciation. These strategic interactions between
domestic and foreign manufacturers provide one possible explanation for
the puzzle of incomplete pass-through. It may not be pro￿t maximizing for
foreign manufacturers to fully pass-through a depreciation in a market where
some domestic manufacturers exploit each increase in a foreign brand￿ s price
to increase their market share.
6.6 Consumer Welfare
Table 16 reports the e⁄ect of a 10-percent depreciation on ￿rms￿pro￿ts
and on consumer welfare. I ￿nd that following the depreciation, foreign
manufacturers su⁄er the most among the domestic actors, as their total
pro￿ts decline by 22.12 percent. Domestic manufacturers bene￿t by the most
as their total pro￿ts increase by 1.71 percent. Consumer surplus decreases
by 8.18 percent following the depreciation and the retailer￿ s total pro￿ts
55decline by 5.04 percent.
Table 16 also reports the percent change in total domestic welfare, de-
￿ned as the sum of the domestic manufacturers￿pro￿ts, the domestic re-
tailer￿ s pro￿ts, and the domestic consumer surplus, following each shock.
To compute total domestic welfare, the change in consumer surplus is con-
verted to a dollar ￿gure by using the compensating variation measure of
Small and Rosen (1981).15 I ￿nd that total domestic welfare declines by
2.85 percent following a 10 percent depreciation.
7 Conclusion
This paper examines the welfare e⁄ects of a change in the nominal exchange
rate using the example of the beer industry. I estimate a structural econo-
metric model that makes it possible to compute manufacturers￿and retailers￿
pass-through of a nominal exchange-rate change without observing whole-
sale prices or ￿rms￿marginal costs. Using the estimated demand system, I
conduct counterfactual experiments to determine whether domestic manu-
facturers, foreign manufacturers, a domestic retailer, or domestic consumers
bear the cost of a change in the nominal exchange-rate.
The results indicate that foreign manufacturers generally bear more of
15I describe the details of this compensating variation measure in Appendix B.
56the cost (or reap more of the bene￿t) of a change in the nominal exchange
rate than do domestic consumers, domestic manufacturers, or the domestic
retailer. Following a 10-percent depreciation, foreign manufacturers￿pro￿ts
decline by 22 percent, while consumer surplus falls by only 8 percent and
the retailer￿ s pro￿ts fall by only 5 percent. The results suggest some strate-
gic interaction between import-competing domestic manufacturers and for-
eign manufacturers following a depreciation. Domestic manufacturers with
brands that are close substitutes for foreign brands increase their pro￿ts by
lowering prices to take market share from foreign manufacturers. Domestic
manufacturers￿pro￿ts increase by 1.7 percent following the depreciation.
In future work, I plan to apply this model to assess the welfare e⁄ects
of nominal exchange-rate ￿ uctuations in other industries and economies,
with some emphasis on developing economies. This paper￿ s approach may
be particularly suited to analyze nominal exchange-rates￿welfare e⁄ects in
developing countries given their often severe data constraints.16
Finally, analysis of the relationship between market structure and exchange-
rate pass-through may be a promising avenue for future research. Recent
work by Campa and Goldberg (2002) suggests that the variation in pass-
through across countries is more a⁄ected by such microeconomic variables as
16As a result, only a handful of published studies estimate exchange-rate pass-through
for developing economies.
57the industry composition of each country￿ s import bundle than by macroeco-
nomic variables. Previous e⁄orts to relate industrial organization variables
to exchange-rate pass-through have proven inconclusive. Though several
theoretical papers, most notably Dornbusch (1987), derive theoretical pre-
dictions for the impact of di⁄erent market structures on pass-through, no
empirical study has subsequently tested these models￿predictions. In fu-
ture work, I plan to extend this paper￿ s model to examine how di⁄erent
vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers a⁄ect exchange-rate
pass-through.
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71A Welfare Calculations
The structural model I use enables me to calculate the change in consumer
welfare following an exchange-rate shock. This change can be given a dollar
￿gure by using the compensating variation measure of Small and Rosen




















ij is consumer i￿ s indirect utility from consuming product j
given its price before the exchange-rate shock, V
post
ij is her indirect utility
from consuming the same product given its price after the exchange-rate
shock, and ￿i is her marginal utility of income which one must assume does




ij are de￿ned in equation
(8) . This calculation assumes that the perceived characteristics of all the
products, including the outside good, do not change over the period of the
exchange-rate shock. I calculate the compensating variation for each of
the 40 individuals I sample for each price zone. As the income e⁄ects for
purchases of beer are minimal, this compensating variation measure equals
the equivalent variation for each of the 40 individuals sampled in each price
zone. The dollar value of the change in consumer surplus is given by the
72average compensating variation across these individuals multiplied by the
population of the relevant market.
I calculate the change in total domestic welfare as the sum of this com-
pensating variation measure, the change in domestic manufacturers￿pro￿ts,






HA Model with Foreign Collusion
1. Double Marginalization (DM) 10.25
2. DM with Foreign Collusion .89
Table 17: Results from non-nested tests to determine which vertical contract
model best explains the data. Each column has the null model being tested
and each row the alternative model against which it is being tested. Non-nested
Cox-type tests can be discriminated using a Vuong (1989) and Villas-Boas (2002)
two-step procedure and are distributed standard normal. One-sided test statistic
at 5 percent signi￿cance levels is 1.65.
74Product Wholesale Con￿dence Manufacturer Con￿dence
Price Interval Marginal Cost Interval
Domestic Brands
Budweiser 37.48 36.92-38.18 28.75 27.67-29.64
Bud Light 37.49 36.80-38.34 27.73 26.71-28.39
Busch 35.70 34.63-36.19 26.48 25.97-27.49
Busch Light 31.53 31.03-32.44 23.38 22.83-23.98
Coors 35.48 34.79-36.21 26.98 26.41-28.02
Coors Light 36.27 35.68-36.97 27.23 26.24-28.05
Keystone 25.86 25.40-26.31 19.04 18.60-19.69
Michelob Light 41.98 41.12-43.39 30.81 30.18-32.37
Miller Genuine Draft 37.46 36.90-38.26 28.91 27.97-29.81
Miller High Life 37.59 36.68-38.44 28.18 26.96-28.56
Miller Lite 36.60 36.06-37.61 27.54 26.71-28.52
Milwaukee￿ s Best 28.26 27.25-28.96 19.42 19.06-20.66
Milwaukee￿ s Best Lite 35.13 34.63-35.50 24.84 24.34-25.72
Old Milwaukee 21.54 20.97-22.38 13.89 13.38-15.37
Old Style 42.72 41.76-44.05 31.63 30.91-32.55
Old Style Classic 34.23 33.15-35.23 25.88 25.54-26.73
Rolling Rock 47.31 45.70-48.58 33.69 32.37-35.81
Special Export 44.25 43.22-45.58 32.90 31.82-34.44
Stroh￿ s 30.02 29.51-30.45 22.64 22.06-23.22
All Domestic Brands 36.02 35.79-36.24 26.77 26.50-27.05
European Brands
Beck￿ s 62.70 60.49-65.55 41.94 39.06-44.62
St. Pauli 73.41 71.01-75.62 50.47 47.07-55.81
Amstel 70.26 66.65-72.68 45.86 42.67-52.07
Grolsch 82.58 80.93-86.19 58.74 56.29-62.01
Heineken 70.70 67.72-72.40 47.10 45.05-53.25
Harp 82.95 78.59-85.27 59.43 52.46-62.11
Peroni 67.08 63.89-70.31 45.52 42.71-49.61
Bass 83.83 81.73-87.86 60.55 57.06-64.50
North American Brands
Foster￿ s 76.45 73.64-79.73 53.23 49.11-58.01
Guinness 85.49 83.20-89.54 61.32 56.36-65.33
Molson Golden 55.19 54.08-59.09 42.10 40.37-44.80
Molson Light 51.55 48.81-56.75 32.50 28.60-38.48
Corona 67.14 64.11-70.26 45.40 42.49-49.61
Tecate 64.02 61.32-65.77 41.83 39.51-45.44
Japanese Brands
Sapporo 76.31 74.54-79.75 53.48 47.84-55.69
All Foreign Brands 71.30 70.35-72.34 48.69 47.68-49.88
All Brands 43.58 42.81-44.54 32.22 31.80-32.65
Table 18: 95-percent con￿dence intervals for the median of the derived mar-
ginal costs for the 34 products in the sample. Median in cents per 12-ounce
serving across 120 markets. Con￿dence intervals calculated using 10,000 bootstrap





Budweiser 22.51 26.70 43.44
Bud Light 24.20 29.64 47.54
Busch 22.66 25.68 42.83
Busch Light 25.20 27.65 46.10
Coors 22.93 27.69 44.16
Coors Light 24.12 29.21 45.52
Keystone 24.72 26.83 45.12
Michelob Light 24.76 29.77 48.28
Miller Genuine Draft 23.01 26.58 43.28
Miller High Life 25.09 26.58 44.26
Miller Lite 24.49 28.26 45.77
Milwaukee￿ s Best 27.23 25.66 45.24
Milwaukee￿ s Best Lite 26.77 27.52 46.93
Old Milwaukee 33.46 34.71 56.80
Old Style 23.53 28.35 46.44
Old Style Classic 22.02 25.87 42.17
Rolling Rock 26.87 30.99 49.90
Special Export 23.71 28.59 46.03
Stroh￿ s 23.57 26.98 43.94
All Domestic Brands 24.42 27.39 45.50
European Brands
Beck￿ s 33.15 31.91 55.46
St. Pauli 31.14 29.16 51.70
Amstel 33.89 30.88 55.08
Grolsch 30.34 27.38 49.74
Heineken 31.86 30.04 53.40
Harp 30.64 27.32 50.10
Peroni 32.93 30.43 54.00
Bass 29.47 26.90 48.81
Other Foreign Brands
Foster￿ s 31.78 28.81 51.68
Guinness 30.59 27.47 50.24
Molson Golden 23.78 28.69 45.95
Molson Light 38.40 35.62 61.71
Corona 33.20 30.54 54.21
Tecate 33.65 31.72 54.95
Sapporo 32.66 29.60 53.33
All Foreign Brands 30.72 29.70 51.72
Table 19: Median derived price-cost margins by product. Median across 120
markets. The margin is markup divided by price with units in percentages. Source:
My calculations.
76Country Mean Median Std Minimum Maximum
Canada 19.33 19.21 .74 17.79 19.33
Germany 35.09 35.16 2.65 31.65 38.32
Holland 38.31 38.84 2.00 35.58 40.57
Ireland 8.21 8.27 .45 7.63 8.78
Italy 25397.40 25678 1621.49 23161 26853
Japan 1615 1619 63.68 1533 1688
Mexico 2111.48 8.59 2895.06 6.35 5670
United Kingdom 7.84 7.86 .24 7.48 8.14
United States 15.01 15.12 .58 14.14 15.63
Table 20: Instruments: Hourly wages in local-currency terms. Annual data.
Hourly compensation for production workers in food, beverage, and tobacco
manufacturing industries, SIC 20 and 21. Source: Foreign Labor Statistics,




Budweiser -6.37 -6.57 to -6.11
Bud Light -5.88 -6.19 to -5.70
Busch -6.49 -6.70 to -6.24
Busch Light -6.02 -6.26 to -5.83
Coors -6.34 -6.53 to -6.11
Coors Light -5.99 -6.23 to -5.73
Keystone -5.85 -5.98 to -5.63
Michelob Light -6.05 -6.35 to -5.81
Miller Genuine Draft -5.91 -6.05 to -5.71
Miller High Life -6.49 -6.69 to -6.27
Miller Lite -5.61 -5.85 to -5.50
Milwaukee￿ s Best -6.09 -6.28 to -5.88
Milwaukee￿ s Best Light -6.27 -6.49 to -6.05
Old Milwaukee -4.75 -4.94 to -4.59
Old Style -6.25 -6.64 to -6.08
Old Style Classic -6.21 -6.35 to -6.01
Rolling Rock -5.95 -6.36 to -5.72
Special Export -6.25 -6.77 to -6.15
Stroh￿ s -6.11 -6.32 to -5.86
European Brands
Beck￿ s -5.71 -6.39 to -5.46
St. Pauli -6.31 -7.11 to -5.88
Amstel -6.06 -6.86 to -5.76
Grolsch -6.70 -7.78 to -6.29
Heineken -6.12 -6.96 to -5.73
Harp -6.70 -7.56 to -6.10
Peroni -6.06 -6.82 to -5.59
Bass -6.85 -7.59 to -6.34
North American Brands
Foster￿ s -6.39 -7.34 to -6.04
Guinness -6.67 -7.36 to -6.18
Molson Golden -6.73 -7.19 to -6.36
Molson Light -5.21 -5.76 to -4.83
Corona -6.04 -6.77 to -5.55
Tecate -5.97 -6.63 to -5.57
Japanese Brands
Sapporo -6.22 -7.08 to -5.91
Table 21: Median own-price demand elasticities. Median across all 120 mar-
kets. 95 percent con￿dence intervals generated with bootstrap simulations.
4080 observations. Source: My calculations.
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